PT Sarana Menara Nusantara Tbk.Full report →1 / 14
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PT Sarana Menara Nusantara Tbk.

PT Sarana Menara Nusantara is Indonesia's largest tower landlord by revenue, leasing 36,247 towers to the country's mobile carriers on long-term contracts; the Hartono family controls about 65% of the shares.

From a January high of $0.037 the shares slid to a $0.018 low in June, then recovered to $0.023 — a six-month round trip that left them near multi-year lows.
$0.023
Share price · 23 Jul 2026
$1.4bn
Market capitalisation
$0.80bn
FY2025 revenue
6.0×
Price / FY2025 earnings
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The statements

Revenue climbed 54% over five years; per-share earnings did not

FY2021 → FY2025as reported · $
Revenue$800M+1%
Operating margin56.3%−0.8pp
Net income$221M+6%
Free cash flow$424M+42%
Open the full statements →
As reported, FY2021–FY2025. Operating margin is EBIT; EBITDA margin is higher.
  • Growth, spread thin. Revenue rose from $0.60bn in 2021 to $0.80bn in 2025, but basic EPS held at $0.0041 — successive equity raises spread a slowly-growing profit over more shares.
  • A landlord's margins. The towers convert more than four-fifths of revenue to EBITDA (82%); after depreciation and a finance-cost wedge that takes ~41% of operating profit, about 28% reaches net profit.
  • Cash ahead of earnings. Free cash flow stepped up to $424M as capex fell to $197M, and net debt/EBITDA dropped to 3.7x from 4.6x.
Valuation gap

The headline free-cash-flow yield is struck before the lenders are paid

From reported cash flow to what reaches equity ($M)
FY2025 audited cash-flow statement; the bridge is drawn by the report.
  • The $424 million of "free cash flow" TOWR reports is struck before it pays its lenders; after $167 million of cash interest and $75 million of lease payments, roughly $180 million actually reaches equity — set against $930 million of debt maturing within a year and $136 million of cash on hand.
  • Real cash, not a mirage. That ~$180M still covers the $72M dividend about 2.5 times; the correction lowers the yield rather than breaking the thesis.
  • The other side. The debt is investment-grade (S&P BBB-, Fitch AAA(idn)), much of the sub-one-year figure is auto-renewing revolvers, and management paid down more than its own operations generated — so in normal markets the rollover is routine.
Control and capital

The controlling family is both the largest owner and a lender

~98%
of the $330M rights issue funded by the Hartono family
$0.038
Subscription price — above today's $0.023
65.2%
Family stake after the raisefrom 60.0%
~9%
of TOWR's debt owed to family bank BCA
  • The Hartono family funded roughly 98% of TOWR's $330 million rights issue at $0.038 a share — above today's $0.023 — while, through its own bank BCA, sitting on the other side of about 9% of the company's debt: the controller is at once its largest owner and a meaningful lender to it.
  • Conviction, not extraction. Roughly $324M of fresh family cash lifted the stake to 65.2% at a price now underwater, diluting minorities below 35% rather than cashing out.
  • Watch the other side. The BCA loan is captive but shrank year-on-year ($290M to $240M), and director pay is controller-set — benign today, a related party on both sides under stress.
Revenue mix

Growth has moved off the towers and into fibre

FY2025 revenue by line ($M)
Tower tenancies fell to 65% of revenue from 71% in 2023.
  • The durable core is flat. Tower-tenancy income — long-term, non-cancellable leases — grew only ~2% to $524M, and now supplies 65% of revenue, down from 71% two years earlier.
  • The growth is lower-margin. VSAT and fibre rose 31% to $93M and services to $183M, which pulls blended EBITDA margin down from 85% toward 82% even as absolute EBITDA rises.
Carrier consolidation

Three carriers now supply 87% of revenue

Customer concentration (FY2025)
ConcentrationFY2025
Largest customer (XLSmart)42% of revenue
Top three customers87% of revenue
Mobile carriers, post-merger3
Lease term~10-yr, non-cancellable
  • A narrower funnel. The XLSmart merger took Indonesia's mobile market to three carriers; one customer is 42% of revenue and the top three are 87%, so pricing power sits with a shrinking buyer base.
  • The tailwind still runs. Each merged carrier must keep densifying for double-digit data-traffic growth, and the leases are ~10-year and non-cancellable — the demand behind the towers has not gone away.
Colocation engine

Spare tower capacity is the lever that has not yet moved

FY2025 revenue growth by line (%)
Tower income $524M (+2.3%); VSAT & fibre $93M (+31.4%).
  • The economics turn on tenants per tower. TOWR ended 2025 at 1.67; the next tenant on a standing tower costs almost nothing, so a rising ratio would drop straight to margin — the free option 5G densification could exercise.
  • The ratio has stalled. Tower income grew ~2% while fibre grew 31%, and peer Tower Bersama's ratio slipped from 1.87 to 1.73 as mergers deduplicate tenants — the lever is dormant, not yet proven.
Debt durability

A family-funded balance-sheet reset in one year

Leverage (x)
The sharpest single-year deleveraging in the five-year record.
  • The right direction. The $330M rights issue plus internal cash cut net debt/EBITDA to 3.7x from 4.6x and net debt/equity to 1.6x from 2.6x; average borrowing cost fell to 6.0% from 6.5%.
  • Still leveraged, still investment-grade. At 3.7x, net debt is near four years of EBITDA and the repair leaned on fresh equity — but ratings are S&P BBB- / Fitch AAA(idn) with interest cover of 3.9x.
Capital allocation

Capital allocation put the balance sheet first

Capital actions, 2025
ActionWhat happened
Rights issue$330M raised, all into Protelindo to repay debt
DividendCut to fund deleveraging — DPS $0.0016 to $0.0010
Buyback~122m shares (~0.2%) — a signal, not a payout
M&A51% of MAN; 40% of listed fibre operator Remala
  • Discipline in sequence. Equity in to cut leverage, dividend trimmed to match, acquisitions kept small and adjacent in fibre and connectivity, buyback token — not a payout sustained on borrowed money.
  • What a bankruptcy-averse owner wants. A controller that injects capital to repair the balance sheet, rather than defending a dividend with debt, is behaving the right way round for a fallen tower landlord.
The multiple

Priced at half its peers, and below its own history

EV / EBITDA (x)
TOWR audited FY2025; peer multiples on FY2026 estimates, not strictly like-for-like.
  • Cheap on every frame. At ~6x earnings and ~6.2x EV/EBITDA, TOWR trades roughly 40% below its own five-year average and about half its listed peers — despite being the largest by tower count and the strongest cash generator.
  • Not cheap without reason. More leverage than peers and a 42% single-customer both argue for some discount; a discount of half the peer multiple, on a deleveraging landlord, is a wide gap to close on fundamentals.
Forward estimates

Consensus expects slow growth and a re-rating, not re-acceleration

Revenue & EBITDA — actual to consensus ($bn)
13 analysts; revenue growth of roughly 2–4.5% a year.
  • Low-single-digit growth. Revenue is seen near $0.84bn in 2026 and $0.86bn in 2027; EPS dips to about $0.0040 on the enlarged share count, then recovers toward $0.0043–0.0044 by 2028 — still barely above the $0.0041 of 2021.
  • Where the target comes from. Nine of 13 analysts sit at their strongest buy, none negative; the bridge to the $0.038 mean target is deleveraging and a multiple re-rating, not a growth story.
Scenarios

The target ladder against a $0.023 price

Analyst targets and illustrative scenarios ($)
13-analyst spread; scenarios are illustrative, not forecasts.
  • An asymmetric spread. The 13-analyst range runs $0.022 low to $0.053 high around a $0.038 mean, some 65% above $0.023; even the most bearish target is only about 6% below today's price.
  • What each side needs. Flat EPS at 5–6x lands near $0.021; a re-rate to TOWR's ~10x historical average on ~$0.0040 EPS lands near $0.040. Targets are not floors.
The read

Cheap for real reasons, and perhaps too cheap

~40%
below its own five-year multiple
~$180M
equity free cash flow after paying lenders
$0.0041
EPS ceiling held since 2021 — the number that must break
  • The bear owns the discount. A landlord that cannot grow per-share earnings and leans on three buyers for 87% of revenue has earned a cheaper multiple than a compounder.
  • The bull owns the asymmetry. 82% EBITDA margins, ~$180M of equity FCF covering the dividend 2.5x, active deleveraging, and a controller adding capital above the market.
  • What decides it. Whether the tower-tenancy line stabilises and whether falling finance costs finally let EPS break the $0.0041 ceiling it has held for five years.
What to watch

A deleveraged, family-backed landlord that is cheap — for reasons real and possibly overdrawn

Read the full report →

This distills a guided study built chapter by chapter — financials, industry, valuation, control and the balance sheet.

Compiled from the full report · 2026-07-23 · For information, not investment advice.